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Abstract
A situation in which a ﬁnite set of players can obtain certain payoﬀs by cooperation can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solu-
tion for TU-games assigns a set of payoﬀ vectors to every TU-game. Some solutions that
are based on distributing dividends are the Shapley value (being the single-valued solu-
tion distributing the dividends equally among the players in the corresponding coalitions)
and the Selectope or Harsanyi set (being the set-valued solution that contains all possible
distributions of the dividends among the players in the corresponding coalitions).
In this paper we assume the players to be hierarchically ordered. We modify the
concept of Harsanyi set to this context by taking into account this hierarchical order when
distributing the dividends of the game. We show that the resulting new solution concept
for games with ordered players, called the Restricted Harsanyi set , is fully characterized
by a collection of seven logically independent properties. We also discuss an alternative
modiﬁcation of the Harsanyi set and a solution concept resulting from adapting the concept
of Selectope to games with ordered players. Some applications show the usefulness of the
Restricted Harsanyi set.
Keywords: TU-game, Harsanyi dividends, Shapley value, Harsanyi set, Selectope, di-
graph.
AMS subject classification: 91A12 (Cooperative games), 5C20 (Directed graphs)
JEL code: C71 (Cooperative games)
1 Introduction
A situation in which a ﬁnite set of players can obtain certain payoﬀs by cooperation can be
described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution
for TU-games assigns a set of payoﬀ vectors (possibly empty or consisting of a unique
element) to every TU-game. In a payoﬀ vector provided by a solution, the payoﬀ assigned
to a particular player depends on the payoﬀs that can be obtained by any coalition of
players. The most well-known single-valued solution is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953),
the most well-known set-valued solution is the Core (Gillies, 1953).
In this paper we assume that the players in a TU-game are part of some hierarchical
structure that is represented by a directed graph. In such games with ordered players the
payoﬀ assigned to a player may depend on both the worths of the coalitions and the position
of the player in the graph. We introduce a solution for such games with ordered players
that is based on distributing the Harsanyi dividends (see Harsanyi, 1959) of a game in the
spirit of the Harsanyi set or Selectope. The dividend of a singleton is equal to its worth
while, recursively, the dividends of all other coalitions are deﬁned as their worth minus
the dividends of all proper subcoalitions. In this sense the dividend of a coalition might
be considered as the earnings of cooperation of the coalition that was not yet realized by
its proper subcoalitions. The Harsanyi set , see Vasil’ev (1978, 1981) and Vasil’ev and van
der Laan (2002),assigns to every TU-game all Harsanyi payoff vectors , being those payoﬀ
vectors that are obtained by distributing every dividend in any possible way among the
players in the corresponding coalition. An alternative deﬁnition of this set is given by the
Selectope of a TU-game, see Hammer et. al. (1977) and Derks et. al. (2000), deﬁned as
the convex hull of all selectope vectors , where the selectope vectors are those vectors where
every dividend is fully assigned to one player of the corresponding coalition.
For games with ordered players we modify the Harsanyi set by requiring that any
dividend is distributed in such a way that a player that is dominated within the coalition
gets a share in this dividend that is at most equal to the share in this dividend assigned to
a player by whom he is dominated. We refer to this set as the Restricted Harsanyi set and
refer to the corresponding solution as the Restricted Harsanyi set solution. The Restricted
Harsanyi set generalizes both the Shapley value and the Harsanyi set for standard TU-
games. In particular, for any directed graph the Shapley value of the TU-game (without
ordered players) belongs to the Restricted Harsanyi set, and it is the unique element of
this set if the digraph is complete, i.e., when each player i dominates each other player j.
On the other hand, for any directed graph the Restricted Harsanyi set is a subset of the
Harsanyi set (of the game without ordered players), and it equals this Harsanyi set in case
the graph is empty.
We provide a full characterization of the Restricted Harsanyi set solution on the class
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of games with ordered players as the unique nonempty solution that satisﬁes a collection of
seven logically independent axioms. Besides the well-known eﬃciency, null player property,
disjoint additivity and sign-preservation properties, it is characterized by convexity and
two properties reﬂecting the hierarchical aspect of games with ordered players, namely
an inferior player property and a consistency property. We also show that any solution
satisfying all axioms except the consistency property assigns to every game with ordered
players a subset of the Restricted Harsanyi set.
Further, besides a second modiﬁcation of the Harsanyi set characterized by alterna-
tive inferior player and consistency properties, we also discuss shortly how to modify the
concept of Selectope to games with ordered players. Although for standard TU-games the
Selectope and Harsanyi set are equivalent, it appears that for games with ordered players
their modiﬁcations give diﬀerent solutions. In fact, the Restricted Selectope solution assigns
to every game with ordered players a (possibly empty) subset of the (always nonempty)
Restricted Harsanyi set.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss some preliminaries on
TU-games and directed graphs. In Section 3 we introduce the Restricted Harsanyi set for
games with ordered players and show some of its properties. In Section 4 we characterize
the Restricted Harsanyi set solution by seven logically independent axioms. In Section 5
we provide an alternative modiﬁcation of the Harsanyi set and we discuss the concept of
Restricted Selectope. An application is given in Section 6, while ﬁnal remarks are made in
Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 TU-games
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, is a pair (N, v), where
N = {1, ..., n} is a ﬁnite set of n players, and v: 2N → R is a characteristic function on N
such that v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is the worth of coalition S, i.e., the
members of coalition S can obtain a total payoﬀ of v(S) by agreeing to cooperate. Since
we take the player set N to be ﬁxed, we represent a TU-game by its characteristic function
v. We denote the collection of all TU-games on N by GN . A special class of TU-games are
unanimity games. For T ⊆ N , T = ∅, the unanimity game uT on N is given by uT (S) = 1
if T ⊆ S, and uT (S) = 0 otherwise. Writing v as a (2n − 1)-dimensional vector with the
worths of the 2n − 1 nonempty coalitions as its components, it is well-known that every
TU-game v is a unique linear combination of unanimity games, i.e., there exist uniquely
determined weights ∆v(T ) ∈ R such that v =
∑
T∈2N\{∅}∆v(T )uT . These weights usually
are called the (Harsanyi) dividends. Recursively, solving v(S) =
∑
T⊆S ∆v(T ) on the
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number of players starting from ∆v({i}) = v({i}) for the single player coalitions yields
∆v(T ) = v(T ) −
∑
S⊂T ∆v(S) =
∑
S⊆T (−1)
|T |−|S|v(S) for T ⊆ N (see Harsanyi (1959)).
A TU-game v is almost positive if ∆v(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N with |S| ≥ 2, and it is totally
positive if also ∆v({i}) = v({i}) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N . Every almost positive game v is a
convex game, i.e. v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for all S, T ⊆ N .
A set-valued solution F on GN assigns a set F (v) ⊂ Rn of payoﬀ vectors to every TU-
game v ∈ GN . A single-valued solution F on GN assigns precisely one vector F (v) ∈ Rn to
every v ∈ GN . Examples of set-valued solutions are the Core and the Selectope or Harsanyi
set. The Core of TU-game v ∈ GN is the set of all eﬃcient payoﬀ vectors that are stable in
the sense that no coalition can do better by separating, i.e., Core(v) = {x ∈ Rn|
∑
i∈N xi =
v(N) and
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N}. As known, the Core of a game can be empty
1.
A set-valued solution F on GN is said to be nonempty when F (v) = ∅ for any v ∈ GN .
The Selectope or Harsanyi set is nonempty for every TU-game. A selector chooses
for every coalition a particular player in the coalition to whom to assign the dividend of
that coalition, i.e., a selector is a function α : 2N \ {∅} → N such that α(T ) ∈ T for all
T ⊆ N . The selectope vector corresponding to selector α and game v ∈ GN is the vector
sα(v) ∈ Rn given by sαi (v) =
∑
T∈2N \{∅}
α(T )=i
∆v(T ). The Selectope S(v) of v then is the convex
hull of all selectope vectors (see Hammer et. al. (1977) and Derks et. al. (2000), i.e.,
S(v) = Conv({sα(v)|α ∈ AN}),
with AN = {α : 2N \ {∅} → N |α(T ) ∈ T for all T ∈ 2N \ {∅}} being the set of all selectors
on N , and Conv({A}) denoting the convex hull of A ⊂ Rn.
For TU-games v ∈ GN , Vasil’ev (1978, 1981) deﬁnes the Harsanyi set H(v) as the
set of payoﬀ vectors obtained by distributing for any coalition the dividend of that coalition
in any possible way among its players, i.e., H(v) is the weighted sum of sets P T ⊂ Rn+
given by
H(v) =
∑
T∈2N\{∅}
∆v(T )P
T ,
with, for T ∈ 2N \ ∅, P T the set of sharing vectors pT ∈ IRn+ deﬁned as
P T =
pT ∈ IRn+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(i) pTi = 0 for all i ∈ N \ T,
(ii) pTi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ T , and
(iii)
∑
i∈T p
T
i = 1
 .
1It is well-known that C(N, v) is nonempty if and only if v is balanced, see e.g. Bondareva (1962) or
Shapley (1967), and is equal to the convex hull of all the marginal vectors of the game if and only if the
game is convex, see Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981).
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The set ∆v(T )P
T gives any possible distribution of ∆v(T ) amongst the players in T and
H(v) is obtained by summing up all these payoﬀ sets over all nonempty sets T . An element
of H(v) is called a Harsanyi payoff vector of game v.
The Harsanyi set and Selectope are equivalent, i.e., H(v) = S(v) for every v ∈ GN .
In Vasil’ev (1981) (see also Derks et. al. (2000) and Vasil’ev and Van der Laan (2002)) it
is shown that (i) for every TU-game v ∈ GN it holds that Core(v) ⊆ H(v) with equality
if and only if v is almost positive, and (ii) H(v) = Core(vH), with vH the convex game
deﬁned by vH(S) = v(S)+
∑
{T | |T∩S|≥1, T∩(N\S)|≥1} max[0,−∆v(T )]. The second assertion
implies that the Harsanyi set has a convex game Core-type structure and thus is not empty.
The latter fact also follows straightforwardly from the Harsanyi set always containing the
Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) being the single-valued solution Sh:GN → IRN given by
Shi(v) =
∑
{S⊆N |i∈S}
∆v(S)
|S|
for every i ∈ N.
So, for every game v the Shapley value yields the Harsanyi payoﬀ vector that is obtained by
taking the sharing vectors pT given by pTi =
1
|T |
for all i ∈ T and every nonempty T ⊆ N .
2.2 Directed graphs
In this paper we assume the players to be part of a hierarchical structure that is represented
by a directed graph. A directed graph or digraph is a pair (N,D) where N = {1, ..., n} is a
ﬁnite set of nodes (representing the players) and D ⊆ N×N is a binary relation on N . We
assume D to be irreﬂexive, i.e. (i, i) ∈ D for all i ∈ N . The collection of all (irrefelxive)
binary relations on N is denoted by DN . Since we assume the ﬁnite set N to be ﬁxed, we
will refer to a binary relation simply as a digraph on N . For a subset A ⊆ D and i ∈ N ,
the nodes in SA(i) := {j ∈ N | (i, j) ∈ A} are called the successors of i in A, and the
nodes in RA(i) := {j ∈ N | (j, i) ∈ A} are called the predecessors of i in A.
For i, j ∈ N , a path between i and j in D is a sequence of nodes (i1, . . . , im) such
that i1 = i, im = j, and {(ik, ik+1), (ik+1, ik)} ∩D = ∅ for k = 1, . . . ,m− 1. A set of nodes
T ⊆ N is connected in D ∈ DN if there is a path between any two nodes in T that only
uses arcs between nodes in T , i.e., if for every i, j ∈ T there is a path (i1, . . . , im) between
i and j such that {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ T . A path (i1, . . . , im) between i and j in D is a directed
path if (ik, ik+1) ∈ D for k = 1, . . . ,m − 1. A directed path (i1, . . . , im), m ≥ 3, in D is a
cycle in D if i1 = im. We call digraph D acyclic if it does not contain any cycle. Finally,
a nonempty set S ∈ 2N is called comprehensive from above in D if [j ∈ S and (i, j) ∈ D]
implies that i ∈ S. A nonempty set S ∈ 2N is called complete in D when S is connected
and comprehensive from above in D. We deﬁne CTD to be the set of complete subsets of T ,
T ⊆ N \ ∅ in (T,D(T )) where D(T ) = {(i, j) ∈ D | {i, j} ⊆ T}. We deﬁne D−1 to be the
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transpose of D, i.e., D−1 = {(i, j) ∈ N × N | (j, i) ∈ D}. Then CTD−1 is the collection of
complete subsets of T in D−1, i.e., a nonempty set S ⊆ T is in CT
D−1
if (i) S is connected in
D and (ii) S is comprehensive from below in D meaning that [j ∈ S and (j, i) ∈ D] implies
that i ∈ S.
3 The Restricted Harsanyi set solution
In this section we propose a modiﬁcation of the Harsanyi set for situations in which players
in a TU-game are part of a hierarchical structure represented by a digraph. A pair (v,D) ∈
GN×DN is called a game with ordered players on N . A (set-valued) solution F on GN×DN
assigns a set F(v,D) ⊂ Rn of payoﬀ vectors to every game with ordered players (v,D).
Applying the idea of the Harsanyi set to games with ordered players we now take
into account the position of the players within the graph when distributing the dividends
of the coalitions by requiring that if i, j ∈ T and (i, j) ∈ D, then the payoﬀ that the
dominating player i receives from the distribution of the dividend ∆v(T ) is at least as
high as the payoﬀ that the dominated player j receives from ∆v(T ). So, for i, j ∈ T and
(i, j) ∈ D we require that pTi ≥ p
T
j when ∆v(T ) > 0, and that p
T
i ≤ p
T
j when ∆v(T ) < 0.
2
For a game v, deﬁne K+v = {T |∆v(T ) > 0} and K
−
v = {T |∆v(T ) < 0} as the sets of
coalitions with positive, respectively, negative dividends in v. Further, let P+TD and P
−T
D
be subsets of P T given by
P+TD = {p
T ∈ P T | pTi ≥ p
T
j for all i, j ∈ T with (i, j) ∈ D},
respectively
P−TD = {p
T ∈ P T | pTi ≤ p
T
j for all i, j ∈ T with (i, j) ∈ D}.
Definition 3.1 The Restricted Harsanyi set of game with ordered players (v,D) ∈ GN ×
DN is the set
H(v,D) =
∑
T∈K+v
∆v(T )P
+T
D +
∑
T∈K−v
∆v(T )P
−T
D .
The Restricted Harsanyi set solution is the solution that assigns the Restricted Harsanyi
set to every game (v,D) ∈ GN ×DN . Since all sets P+TD and P
−T
D are polytopes, note that
also H(v,D) is a polytope for any (v,D). The deﬁnition of the Restricted Harsanyi Set
implies that it always contains the Shapley value and is contained in the Harsanyi set of
the game.
2The shares don’t matter when ∆v(T ) = 0.
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Theorem 3.2 For every (v,D) ∈ GN ×DN it holds that Sh(v) ∈ H(v,D) ⊆ H(v).
Proof. Let (v,D) ∈ GN × DN . Take pTi =
1
|T |
if i ∈ T , and pTi = 0 otherwise. Clearly,∑
T∈2N\{∅}∆v(T )p
T = Sh(v). Further, for any T we have that pT ∈ P+TD ∩ P
−T
D for every
D ∈ DN . Hence Sh(v) ∈ H(v,D). The inclusion H(v,D) ⊆ H(v) follows immediately
from the fact that both P+TD ⊆ P
T and P−TD ⊆ P
T . 
Note that Sh(v) ∈ H(v,D) implies that H(v,D) = ∅ for all (v,D) ∈ GN × DN .
The Restricted Harsanyi set H(v,D) generalizes both the Shapley value and the Harsanyi
set for TU-games, in the sense that the corresponding inclusions in Theorem 3.2 can be
equalities.
Theorem 3.3 Let D ∈ DN . Then
(i) H(v,D) = {Sh(v)} for every v ∈ GN if and only if D = N ×N ;
(ii) H(v,D) = H(v) for every v ∈ GN if and only if D = ∅.
Proof. (i) If Take D = N ×N . Then (i, j) ∈ D for all i, j ∈ N , and thus P+TD = P
−T
D =
{pT ∈ P T | pTi = p
T
j for all i, j ∈ T} = {p
T ∈ P T | pTi =
1
|T |
for all i ∈ T} for any T = ∅.
So H(v,D) = {Sh(v)} for every v ∈ GN . Only if Suppose that D = N × N , i.e., there
exist i, j ∈ N, i = j, with (i, j) ∈ D. Take v = u{i,j} and let e
j ∈ IRN be given by ejj = 1
and ejh = 0 for all h ∈ N \ {j}. Then e
j ∈ H(v,D) although ej = Sh(v).
(ii) If Take D = ∅. Then P+TD = P
−T
D = P
T for any T = ∅, implying that H(v,D) = H(v).
Only if Suppose that D = ∅, i.e., there exist i, j ∈ N, i = j, with (i, j) ∈ D. Again, take
v = u{i,j} and consider e
j ∈ IRN . Then ej ∈ H(v,D) although ej ∈ H(v). 
To ﬁnd the extreme points of the Restricted Harsanyi set, the following theorem
from van den Brink et. al. (2004) about the extreme points of the set P+TD is useful. For
S ⊆ N , let aS ∈ IRn be the vector with components aSi =
1
|S|
when i ∈ S and aSi = 0,
otherwise. The lemma says that aS is an extreme point of P+TD if and only if S is a complete
subset of T . For the proof we refer to van den Brink et. al. (2004).
Theorem 3.4 For T ⊆ N , the set of extreme points of P+TD is given by
Ex(P+TD ) = {a
S ∈ IRn | S ∈ CTD}.
For the extreme points of P−TD the next corollary follows straightforwardly from Theorem
3.4 and is given without proof.
Corollary 3.5 The set of extreme points of P−TD is given by
Ex(P−TD ) = {a
S ∈ IRn | S ∈ CTD−1}.
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We conclude this section with some examples in which we apply Theorem 3.4 to
ﬁnd the extreme points.
Example 3.6 (i) Consider the game with ordered players (v,D) on N = {1, 2, 3} given
by v = u{1,2} + u{1,3} and D = {(1, 3), (2, 3)}. First observe that H(v) = P
{1,2} + P {1,3} =
Conv({(1, 0, 0)⊤, (0, 1, 0)⊤}) +Conv({(1, 0, 0)⊤, (0, 0, 1)⊤}) =
Conv({(2, 0, 0)⊤, (1, 1, 0)⊤, (1, 0, 1)⊤, (0, 1, 1)⊤}). The Restricted Harsanyi set is equal to
H(v,D) = P+{1,2}D + P
+{1,3}
D = P
{1,2} + {p{1,3} ∈ P {1,3} | p{1,3}1 ≥ p
{1,3}
3 }. It follows that
H(v,D) = Conv({(1, 0, 0)⊤, (0, 1, 0)⊤}) + Conv({(1, 0, 0)⊤, (1
2
, 0, 1
2
)⊤}) =
Conv({(2, 0, 0)⊤, (1, 1, 0)⊤, (11
2
, 0, 1
2
)⊤, (1
2
, 1, 1
2
)⊤}), see Figure 1.
(ii) Consider the game with ordered players (v,D) on N = {1, 2, 3} given by v = 2u{1,2} −
u{2,3} and D = {(1, 2), (2, 3)}. In this case we have that H(v) = 2P {1,2} − P {2,3} =
Conv({(2, 0, 0)⊤, (0, 2, 0)⊤}) + Conv({(0,−1, 0)⊤, (0, 0,−1)⊤}) =
Conv({(2,−1, 0)⊤, (0, 1, 0)⊤, (2, 0,−1)⊤, (0, 2,−1)⊤}). The Restricted Harsanyi set is equal
toH(v,D) = 2P+{1,2}D −P
−{2,3}
D = 2{p
{1,2} ∈ P {1,2} | p{1,2}1 ≥ p
{1,2}
2 }−{p
{2,3} ∈ P {2,3} | p{2,3}2 ≤
p
{2,3}
3 } = Conv({(2, 0, 0)
⊤, (1, 1, 0)⊤}+ Conv{(0,−1
2
,−1
2
)⊤, (0, 0,−1)⊤}) =
Conv({(2,−1
2
,−1
2
)⊤, (1, 1
2
,−1
2
)⊤, (2, 0,−1)⊤, (1, 1,−1)⊤}). 
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Figure 1: H(v,D) of Example 3.6.(i).
4 Axiomatic characterization of the Restricted Harsanyi
set solution
In this section we characterize the Restricted Harsanyi set solution as the unique nonempty
solution on GN ×DN satisfying a collection of seven logically independent axioms. Let F
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be a solution on GN × DN assigning a set F(v,D) of payoﬀ vectors to any game (v,D).
The ﬁrst ﬁve axioms are generalizations of standard axioms in cooperative game theory,
and are discussed for TU-games in Vasil’ev and van der Laan (2002).
Axiom (Convexity) The set F(v,D) ⊂ IRn is convex.
Axiom (Efficiency) Any payoﬀ vector in the solution is eﬃcient, i.e.
∑
i∈N xi = v(N)
for all x ∈ F(v,D).
Recall that a player i ∈ N is a null player in v ∈ GN if v(S) = v(S \ {i}) for all S ⊆ N .
Axiom (Null player property) Any payoﬀ vector x ∈ F(v,D) satisﬁes xi = 0, whenever
i is a null player in v.
Two games v,w ∈ GN are called disjoint if ∆v(T )∆w(T ) = 0 for all T ∈ 2N \ {∅}, i.e. any
coalition has a nonzero dividend in at most one of these two games.
Axiom (Disjoint additivity) If v and w are disjoint games, then F(v + w,D) =
F(v,D) + F(w,D).
Let V + ⊂ GN be the collection of totally positive games (all dividends are nonnegative)
and V − ⊂ GN the collection of totally negative games (all dividends are nonpositive). The
next axiom states that in games with nonnegative (respectively nonpositive) dividends all
payoﬀs are nonnegative (respectively nonpositive).
Axiom (Sign preservation) The set F(v,D) ⊆ IRn+ if v ∈ V
+, and F(v,D) ⊆ IRn− if
v ∈ V −.
Next we introduce two new properties. The ﬁrst one reﬂects the hierarchical dominance.
It states that players always earn at least as much as players that are inferior to them.
We call player j inferior to player i in (v,D) ∈ GN × DN if (i, j) ∈ D and ∆v(T ) = 0 if
T ∈ Ω{i,j} = {T ⊂ N | |{i, j} ∩ T | = 1} being the set of all subsets T of N that either
contains i or j (but not both).
Axiom (Inferior player property) Any payoﬀ vector x ∈ F(v,D) satisﬁes xi ≥ xj
whenever j is inferior to i.
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Observe that it may happen that both (i, j) ∈ D and (j, i) ∈ D and that ∆v(T ) = 0 for
all T ∈ Ω{i,j}. In this case i is inferior to j and j is inferior to i, so that the inferior player
property says that xi = xj for any x ∈ F(v,D).
The last property is a consistency property. For any pair of nonempty sets T ⊆ N
and R ⊆ T we deﬁne the game vR,T by
vR,T (S) =
{
v(S) if T ⊆ S,
v(S) + |R∩S||R| ∆v(T ) , otherwise.
The next proposition follows by straightforward calculation of the dividends and is given
without proof.
Proposition 4.1 For T ⊆ N and R ⊆ T the dividends of game vR,T are given by
∆vR,T (S) =


∆v(S) +
1
|R|
∆v(T ) if S ⊆ R, |S| = 1,
0 if S = T,
∆v(S) otherwise.
So, in terms of the dividends the game vR,T is obtained from the original game by distrib-
uting the dividend of coalition T equally amongst the players in R. Recall that a selector
chooses for any nonempty coalition one of the players in that coalition as some represen-
tative to whom to assign the dividend of that coalition. In the game vR,T the coalition T
becomes a ‘null coalition’ in the sense that its dividend is zero, while the players in R are
chosen to represent T meaning that they all individually get an equal share in the dividend
of T .
Recall that CTD is the collection of subsets of T that are connected and comprehen-
sive from above in D, while CTD−1 is the collection of subsets of T that are connected and
comprehensive from below in D.
Axiom (Coalitional consistency property) Consider T ⊆ N, T = ∅. For all R ∈ CTD,
F(vR,T ,D) ⊆ F(v,D) if ∆v(T ) > 0; for all R ∈ CTD−1 , F(vR,T ,D) ⊆ F(v,D) if ∆v(T ) < 0.
This property states that by allocating the dividend of a coalition equally among some of
the players in that coalition, we do not obtain new payoﬀ vectors in the solution. Going
from a game v with ordered players to the game vR,T with the same ordering of the players,
we don not yet assign payoﬀs to the players, but we allocate one of the coalitional dividends
to singleton dividends. Considering this as a partial solution, then the consistency require-
ment is that the payoﬀ vectors assigned to the new game should also be payoﬀ vectors in
the original game.
To prove that H(v,D) is characterized by the seven axioms stated above, we ﬁrst
state three lemmas. In the sequel sT denotes +T when s = 1, and −T when s = −1.
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Lemma 4.2 Let F be a solution on GN×DN satisfying efficiency, the null player property,
sign preservation and the inferior player property. Then for any D ∈ DN and nonempty
T ⊆ N , we have that F(uT ,D) ⊆ P
+T
D and F(−uT , D) ⊆ −P
−T
D .
Proof. Let x ∈ F(suT , D), s ∈ {−1,+1}. Then, from eﬃciency it follows that
∑
i∈N xi =
s and by sign preservation we have that xi ≥ 0, i ∈ N , when s = +1, respectively xi ≤ 0,
i ∈ N , when s = −1. From the null player property we have that xi = 0 if i ∈ N \ T .
Finally, from the inferior player property we obtain that for any two players i, j ∈ T with
(i, j) ∈ D it holds that xi ≥ xj. Hence F(suT ,D) ⊆ sP
sT
D . 
In the proof of the next lemma we apply Theorem 3.4 and its Corollary 3.5 on the
extreme points of P+TD , respectively, P
−T
D .
Lemma 4.3 Let F be a nonempty solution on GN×DN satisfying convexity, efficiency, the
null player property, disjoint additivity and coalitional consistency. Then for any D ∈ DN
and nonempty T ⊆ N , we have that P+TD ⊆ F(uT ,D) and −P
−T
D ⊆ F(−uT , D).
Proof. It follows from Proposition 4.1 that for R ⊆ T the game swR,T = (suT )R,T
satisﬁes
swR,T =
∑
i∈R
1
|R|
su{i}.
From the non-emptiness, eﬃciency and the null player property it follows that for any
D, F( 1|R|su{i}, D) =
1
R
sa{i}, i ∈ N . Then disjoint additivity implies that F(swR,T , D) =∑
i∈R F(
1
|R|su{i}, D) =
∑
i∈R
1
R
sa{i} = saR. Hence coalitional consistency implies that
aR ∈ F(uT , D) for any R ∈ CTD, and −a
R ∈ F(−uT , D) for any R ∈ CTD−1. Finally, with
Theorem 3.4, respectively Corollary 3.5, convexity implies that P+TD = Conv({a
R, R ∈
CTD}) ⊆ F(uT , D) and −P
−T
D = Conv({−a
R, R ∈ CT
D−1
}) ⊆ F(−uT , D). 
Lemma 4.4 Let F be a nonempty solution on GN × DN satisfying convexity, efficiency,
the null player property, disjoint additivity, sign preservation, the inferior player property
and coalitional consistency. Then for any D ∈ DN , nonempty T ⊆ N and c > 0, we have
that F(cuT , D) = cP
+T
D and F(−cuT ,D) = c(−P
−T
D ).
Proof. For c = 1, the statement follows immediately from Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3. For
positive c = 1 it follows from the fact that the set of extreme points of csP sTD is given by
Ex(csP sTD ) = csEx(P
sT
D ), s ∈ {−1,+1}. The result then follows by repeating the reasoning
given in the Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 for the games csuT . 
We now come to the main theorem.
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Theorem 4.5 A nonempty solution F on GN × DN satisfies convexity, efficiency, the
null player property, disjoint additivity, sign preservation, the inferior player property and
coalitional consistency, if and only if F is the Restricted Harsanyi set solution.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that the (nonempty) Restricted Harsanyi set solution
satisﬁes these properties. To show uniqueness, suppose that a nonempty solution F on
GN ×DN satisﬁes the seven axioms. From disjoint additivity we have that
F(v,D) =
∑
T∈2N\∅
F(∆v(T )uT ,D)
=
∑
T∈K+v
F(∆v(T )uT , D) +
∑
T∈K−v
F(∆v(T )uT ,D).
With Lemma 4.4 it then follows that
F(v,D) =
∑
T∈K+v
∆v(T )P
+T
D +
∑
T∈K−v
∆v(T )P
−T
D = H(v,D).

We show logical independence of the seven axioms in Theorem 4.5 by the following
alternative solutions on GN ×DN .
1. Solution FC given by FC(v,D) =
∑
T∈K+v
∆v(T )Ex(P
+T
D )+
∑
T∈K−v
∆v(T )Ex(P
−T
D )
satisﬁes the axioms of Theorem 4.5 except convexity.
2. Solution FE given by FE(v,D) = µH(v,D) for some positive µ = 1, satisﬁes the
axioms of Theorem 4.5 except eﬃciency.
3. Deﬁne v ∈ IRn by vi =
1
|N |v(N). Solution FNP given by FNP (v,D) = µ{v} + (1 −
µ)H(v,D), for some µ, 0 < µ < 1, satisﬁes the axioms of Theorem 4.5 except the
null player property.
4. Let 0 denote the null-vector in IRn. Solution FDA given by FDA(v,D) = {0} when
v(N) = 0 and FDA(v,D) = H(v,D) otherwise, satisﬁes the axioms of Theorem 4.5
except disjoint additivity.
5. For some ǫ > 0, deﬁne P T (ǫ) = {pT ∈ IRn | pTi = 0, if i ∈ T, p
T
i ≥ −ǫ if
i ∈ T , and
∑
i∈T p
T
i = 1, T ∈ 2
N \ {∅}}. Let P+TD (ǫ) and P
−T
D (ǫ) be as deﬁned
before, but with P T (ǫ) instead of P T , and deﬁne the solution Hǫ by Hǫ(v,D) =∑
T∈K+v
∆v(T )P
+T
D (ǫ) +
∑
T∈K−v
∆v(T )P
−T
D (ǫ). Solution FSP given by FSP (v,D) =
Hǫ(v,D) satisﬁes the axioms of Theorem 4.5 except sign preservation.
6. Solution FIP given by FIP (v,D) = H(v,D) satisﬁes the axioms of Theorem 4.5
except the inferior player property.
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7. Solution FRG given by FRG(v,D) = {Sh(v)} satisﬁes the axioms of Theorem 4.5
except coalitional consistency.
The results stated above imply several corollaries for games with ordered players and
for (unrestricted) TU-games. First, from Lemma 4.2, Lemma 4.4 and Theorem 4.5 it follows
that for any solution F satisfying eﬃciency, the null player property, sign preservation
and the inferior player property, it holds that F(scuT , D) ⊆ csP
sT
D = H(scuT , D), s ∈
{−1,+1}. From this it follows that F(v,D) ⊆ H(v,D) for any solution F that satisﬁes
these four axioms and disjoint additivity. So, the Restricted Harsanyi set solution is the
maximal (with respect to set inclusion) solution that satisﬁes eﬃciency, the null player
property, sign preservation, the inferior player property and disjoint additivity.
Second, let FConv and FCl be the solutions that assign to every game with ordered
players (v,D) the sets Conv(F(v,D)), respectively Cl(F(v,D)), where Cl(A) denotes the
closure of set A. Then it is easy to verify that when F satisﬁes eﬃciency, the null player
property, sign preservation, the inferior player property and disjoint additivity, then also
FConv and FCl satisfy these ﬁve axioms.3 Hence, when F satisﬁes eﬃciency, the null
player property, sign preservation, the inferior player property and disjoint additivity, then
also Conv(F(v,D)) ⊆ H(v,D) and Cl(F(v,D)) ⊆ H(v,D).
These results for games with ordered players are summarized in the next corollary.
Corollary 4.6 On the class GN ×DN we have that:
(i) F(v,D) ⊆ H(v,D) for any (v,D) when F satisfies efficiency, the null player property,
sign preservation, the inferior player property and disjoint additivity;
(ii) When the solution F satisfies the efficiency, the null player property, sign preservation,
the inferior player property and disjoint additivity, then also the solutions FConv and FCl
satisfy these properties.
When D = ∅ the inferior player property gives no restriction. Deﬁning F (v) =
F(v, ∅) as a solution for TU-games (i.e. a solution on GN), then F (v) ⊆ H(v) when
F satisﬁes eﬃciency, the null player property, sign preservation and disjoint additivity.
Moreover, Theorem 4.5 gives a characterization of the Harsanyi set for TU-games as the
unique nonempty solution on GN that satisﬁes convexity, eﬃciency, the null player property,
sign preservation, coalitional consistency and disjoint additivity4. Further, note that in this
case R ⊆ T is complete in D, respectively in D−1, if and only if R is a singleton coalition.
3Disjoint additivity follows from the well-known fact that for any two sets A,B ⊂ IRn, it holds that
Conv(A+B) = Conv(A) + Conv(B), respectively, when at least one of the sets is bounded, Cl(A+B) =
Cl(A) + Cl(B).
4Note that on the class of games with ordered players all these axioms are deﬁned for a ﬁxed D ∈ DN .
Here we refer to corresponding axioms on the class of TU-games which are obtained by taking D = ∅.
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So, coalitional consistency reduces to F(vR,T , D) ⊆ F(v,D) for all R = {i} ⊆ T , i.e., only
the games vR,T in which the dividend of coalition T is fully given to some player in T are
considered. This axiom replaces the individually consistency axiom in the characterization
of the Harsanyi set given in Vasil’ev and van der Laan (2002), while the other ﬁve axioms
are the same.
Finally, when D = N ×N , the inferior player property implies unanimity symmetry
(i.e. in a unanimity game all players in the unanimity coalition get the same). Moreover,
in this case R is comprehensive from above, respectively below, in T given D if and only
if R = T . Hence, coalitional consistency reduces to F(vR,T , D) ⊆ F(v,D) for R = T , i.e.,
only the game vR,T in which the dividend of coalition T is equally divided amongst the
players in T are considered. For unanimity games this also reduces to unanimity symmetry.
Since H(v,D) = {Sh(v)} when D = N × N , we obtain a characterization of the Shapley
value as the unique single-valued solution satisfying eﬃciency, the null player property,
disjoint additivity and unanimity symmetry. Note that disjoint additivity and unanimity
symmetry are weaker than the corresponding axioms used in the famous characterization of
the Shapley value in Shapley (1953). Also note that in this case sign preservation (although
satisﬁed by the Shapley value) is superﬂuous in the characterization5.
These results for TU-games are summarized in the next corollary.
Corollary 4.7 On the class GN of TU-games we have that:
(i) if solution F on GN satisfies efficiency, the null player property, sign preservation and
disjoint additivity, then F (v) ⊆ H(v) for all v ∈ GN ;
(ii) the Harsanyi set solution H is the unique nonempty solution on GN that satisfies
convexity, efficiency, the null player property, sign preservation, coalitional consistency for
all R = {i} ⊆ T , T ⊆ N , and disjoint additivity;
(iii) the Shapley value is the unique single-valued solution on GN that satisfies efficiency,
the null player property, unanimity symmetry and disjoint additivity.
5 Other solutions for games with ordered players
The inferior player property reﬂects a very strong dominance of player i above player j
when (i, j) ∈ D. In fact, it gives the dominating player not only the power to extract a
higher share than the dominated player in the dividend of a coalition when that dividend is
positive, but also the power to give the dominated player a higher share than the dominat-
ing player when the dividend is negative. To give an extreme example, let D be a graph in
which (1, j) ∈ D and (j, 1) ∈ D for any j = 1. Then x with x1 =
∑
{T |1∈T, ∆v(T )>0}
∆v(T )
5Convexity is not listed here, because this is redunded in case of single-valuedness.
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is in the Restricted Harsanyi set, giving player 1 all positive dividends of the coalitions
containing player 1, but nothing of the negative dividends.
Depending on the particular organizational (hierarchical) structure reﬂected by the
digraphD, an alternative dominance relation would be in which the share of the dominating
player in the dividend of a coalition is always at least as high as the share of a dominated
player. For instance, this could reﬂect situations in which a dominating player takes higher
risks than a dominated player and therefore get a higher share in positive dividends, but
also in negative dividends.
This is reﬂected by the following notion and corresponding axiom. We call player j
weak inferior to player i in (v,D) ∈ GN ×DN if (i) ∆v(T ) = 0 if T ∈ Ω{i,j} and (ii) either
(i, j) ∈ D and ∆v(T ) ≥ 0 for all T containing i and j, or (j, i) ∈ D and ∆v(T ) ≤ 0 for all
T containing i and j.
Axiom (Weak inferior player property) Any payoﬀ vector x ∈ F(v,D) satisﬁes
xi ≥ xj whenever j is weak inferior to i.
The axiom says that the payoﬀ to player i is at least as high as the payoﬀ to player
j if all dividends of the coalitions containing either i or j are zero and either i dominates j
and all dividends of the coalitions containing i and j are nonnegative, or if i is dominated
by j and all dividends of the coalitions containing i and j are nonpositive. Clearly, the
axiom is satisﬁed when in any coalition containing i and j, the share of player i in the
dividend is at least as high as the share of player j, irrespective whether the dividend
is positive or negative. This holds when for any T the sharing vector is in the set P+TD ,
irrespective of the sign of the dividend. This gives as alternative solution the Weak Inferior
Player (WIP) Restricted Harsanyi set solution.
Definition 5.1 TheWIP Restricted Harsanyi set solution is the solution HW on GN×DN
defined by
HW (v,D) =
∑
T∈2N\∅
∆v(T )P
+T
D , (v,D) ∈ G
N ×DN .
Similarly as in the previous section the solution can be characterized by modifying
coalitional consistency to sign-independent coalitional consistency.
Axiom (Sign-independent coalitional consistency) For all R ∈ CTD, F(vR,T ,D) ⊆
F(v,D).
The next theorem characterizes the WIP Restricted Harsanyi set solution by similar axioms
as those in Theorem 4.5.
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Theorem 5.2 A nonempty solution F on GN ×DN satisfies convexity, efficiency, the null
player property, sign preservation, the weak inferior player property, sign-independent coali-
tional consistency and disjoint additivity, if and only if F is the WIP Restricted Harsanyi
set solution.
Since the proof goes along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 4.5, we leave it to the
reader. In the next example we compare the two solutions.
Example 5.3 Consider game (ii) of Example 3.6, i.e., N = {1, 2, 3}, v = 2u{1,2} − u{2,3}
and D = {(1, 2), (2, 3)}. Then HW (v) = 2P+{1,2}D − P
+{2,3}
D =
2{p{1,2} ∈ P {1,2} | p{1,2}1 ≥ p
{1,2}
2 } − {p
{2,3} ∈ P {2,3} | p{2,3}2 ≥ p
{2,3}
3 }. It follows that
HW (v,D) = Conv({(2, 0, 0)⊤, (1, 1, 0)⊤}) + Conv({(0,−1
2
,−1
2
)⊤, (0,−1, 0)⊤}) =
Conv({(2,−1
2
,−1
2
)⊤, (1, 1
2
,−1
2
)⊤, (2,−1, 0)⊤, (1, 0, 0)⊤}). 
Next we consider shortly how to apply the concept of selector to games with ordered
players. Recall that a selector chooses for every coalition a particular player in the coalition
to whom to assign the dividend of that coalition. In accordance with reasoning used in
deﬁning the Restricted Harsanyi set solution, when the players are ordered according to a
digraph D ∈ DN we put as restriction on a selector that the dividend of a coalition should
always be assigned to a player that has no predecessors in the coalition when the dividend
is positive, and to a player that has no successors in the coalition when the dividend is
negative. So, we consider only selectors in the sets
A+ND = {α ∈ A
N |for every T ∈ 2N \ {∅}: [{i, j} ⊆ T and (i, j) ∈ D]⇒ α(T ) = j},
respectively
A−ND = {α ∈ A
N |for every T ∈ 2N \ {∅}: [{i, j} ⊆ T and (j, i) ∈ D]⇒ α(T ) = j},
We obtain the following deﬁnition.
Definition 5.4 The Restricted Selectope of game with ordered players (v,D) ∈ GN ×DN
is the set S(v,D) = Conv({sα(v)|α ∈ A+ND ,∆v(T ) > 0} ∪ {s
α(v)|α ∈ A−ND ,∆v(T ) < 0}).
We refer to the solution that assigns to every game with ordered players its Re-
stricted Selectope as the Restricted Selectope solution. Obviously, for every (v,D) ∈
GN ×DN we have S(v,D) ⊆ S(v) since A+ND ∪A
−N
D ⊆ A
N . Note that A+ND = A
−N
D = A
N
if and only if D = ∅. Therefore S(v,D) = H(v) = H(v,D) if D = ∅. On the other hand,
A+ND = A
−N
D = ∅ if (and only if) D contains a cycle. This implies that S(v,D) = ∅ if
there is a cycle in D. It is straightforwardly to verify that the Restricted Selectope solution
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satisﬁes eﬃciency, the null player property, disjoint additivity, sign preservation and the
inferior player property. Hence, according to Corollary 4.6 it holds that
S(v,D) ⊆ H(v,D).
As we showed, this inclusion holds with equality when D = ∅ (since then both sets are
equal to H(v)), whereas S(v,D) = ∅ when D contains a cycle. So, when we require that
a solution is nonempty, we have to restrict ourselves to the class of acyclic digraphs. In a
subsequent paper we intend to provide a full characterization of the restricted Selectope
on the class of ordered games with acyclic digraphs. Finally, the Selectope analogue of the
WIP Restricted Harsanyi set solution is given by SW (v,D) = Conv({sα(v)|α ∈ A+ND }).
Example 5.5 Consider the game with ordered players (v,D) on N = {1, 2, 3} of Example
3.6.(i), i.e. v = u{1,2}+u{1,3} and D = {(1, 3), (2, 3)}. The unrestricted and restricted Selec-
tope, respectively, are given by S(v) = H(v) = Conv({(2, 0, 0)⊤, (1, 0, 1)⊤, (1, 1, 0)⊤, (0, 1, 1)⊤})
and S(v,D) = Conv({(2, 0, 0)⊤, (1, 1, 0)⊤}). 
6 An application: airport games
Suppose there are n airplanes that want to use the same landing strip. The n airplanes
are diﬀerent and therefore need landing strips of diﬀerent size. Assume that the airplanes
are labeled so that the cost of building a landing strip for airplane i ∈ {1, ..., n} is given
by ci satisfying c1 ≥ c2 ≥ ... ≥ cn ≥ 0. The corresponding airport game (see Littlechild
and Owen (1973)) is a cost game (N, v) with the set of airplanes as the set of players
and the characteristic function given by v(S) = maxi∈S ci for all S ⊆ N . As noticed by
Braˆnzei et. al. (2002) the dual6 airport game v∗ is given by v∗ =
∑n
i=1(ci − ci+1)u[1,i],
with cn+1 = 0, where [1, i] denotes the set {1, . . . , i} of consecutive players including player
1. The dividend of coalition {1, ..., i} is the additional cost (ci − ci+1) of extending the
landing strip that is suﬃcient for all aircrafts that are smaller than i, so that also i can
use it. All other coalitions have dividend equal to zero. Since eventually also all larger
airplanes j ∈ {1, ..., i− 1} will use this part of the landing strip, and all smaller airplanes
j ∈ {i+ 1, ..., n} will not use it, it seems reasonable to divide the cost (ci − ci+1) among i
and all larger airplanes 1, ..., i − 1. This is done by the Harsanyi set of the dual (airport)
game. In addition, the Restricted Harsanyi set corresponding to the directed line-graph
L = {(i, i+1) ∈ N×N | i = 1, . . . , n−1} (i.e. the agents are linearly ordered from 1 to n),
distributes these costs in such a way that for every part of the landing strip larger airplanes
pay at least as much as smaller airplanes. (Note that the WIP Restricted Harsanyi set is
6For any game v ∈ GN , the dual game is given by v∗(S) = v(N)− v(N \ S) for all S ⊆ N .
16
the same since all dividends are nonnegative.) Extreme points are given by the Shapley
value in which all airplanes that use part of the landing strip pay the same share in the
corresponding cost, and the unique element of the Restricted Selectope which charges all
the cost for the full landing strip to the largest airplane. The Restricted Harsanyi set
provides a collection of reasonable cost allocations with the Shapley value and the unique
element of the Restricted Selectope as two of its extreme points.
Example 6.1 Take N = {1, 2, 3} and costs (c1, c2, c3)⊤ given by (3, 2, 1)⊤. The dual game
of the corresponding airport game is the game v∗ on N given by v∗ = u{1}+u{1,2}+u{1,2,3}.
The Harsanyi set of this game (which by totally positiveness equals its Core) is equal to
H(v∗) = Conv({(3, 0, 0)⊤, (2, 0, 1)⊤, (1, 2, 0)⊤, (1, 1, 1)⊤}),
while the Restricted Harsanyi set of this game is equal to the sum of H(u{1}, L) =
Conv({(1, 0, 0)⊤}), H(u{1,2}, L) = Conv({(1, 0, 0)
⊤, (1
2
, 1
2
, 0)⊤}) and
H(u{1,2,3}, L) = Conv({(1, 0, 0)
⊤, (1
2
, 1
2
, 0)⊤, (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
)⊤}), and is thus given by
H(v∗, L) = Conv({(3, 0, 0)⊤, (2, 1, 0)⊤, (1
5
6
,
5
6
,
1
3
)⊤, (2
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
)⊤}),
see Figure 3. The Shapley value Sh(v∗) = (15
6
, 5
6
, 1
3
)⊤ and the unique element s(v∗) =
(3, 0, 0)⊤ of the Restricted Selectope element are two of its extreme points. 
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Figure 2: The Restricted Harsanyi set H(v∗,D) of Example 6.1.
Other applications where the Restricted Harsanyi solution could be applied are,
for instance, sequencing situations, see e.g. Curiel et. al. (1989), auction games, see
e.g. Graham et.al. (1990), and water distributions problems, see Ambec and Sprumont
(2002). In van den Brink et. al. (2006) these problems are modelled as line-graph games.
Considering other grph structures we can generalize these models. For example, the water
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distribution problem considers the distribution of water among agents allocated along a
river from upstream to downstream. Situations with side rivers joining the main stream
and river delta situations can be modelled by more general directed graphs satisfying that
a pair of agents (i, j) ∈ D if and only if j is a downstream ‘neighbour’ of i.
7 Final remarks
In this paper we assumed the players in a cooperative TU-game to belong to a hierarchical
structure which restricts the payoﬀ distribution in the game and we propose the concept
of the Restricted Harsanyi set as solution concept for such situations. This restricted
Harsanyi set provides a collection of payoﬀ distributions obtained by taking into account
the hierarchical structure when distributing the dividends. Theorem 3.2 states that the
Restricted Harsanyi set is a subset of the Harsanyi set of the game (without ordered players)
which always contains the Shapley value of this game. Also, we have seen, for instance
in Example 6.1, that the Restricted Harsanyi set cannot be obtained as the core of some
modiﬁed game. This in contrast with the Harsanyi set for TU-games which equals the
core of the game vH as deﬁned in Section 2. For future research this opens the question
whether it could be possible to deﬁne the Restricted Harsanyi set as a set of payoﬀ vectors
satisfying a system of linear (in)-equalities.
Another game theoretic model in which players in a TU-game belong to a hierar-
chical structure are the games with a permission structure as considered in Gilles et. al.
(1992), Gilles and Owen (1994), van den Brink and Gilles (1996) and van den Brink (1997)7.
In these games it is assumed that players need permission from other players before they
are allowed to cooperate within a coalition. So, instead of restricting payoﬀ distributions,
in these games with permission structure the cooperation possibilities are restricted8. For
instance, in the conjunctive approach to these games as developed in Gilles et. al. (1992)
and van den Brink and Gilles (1996), it is assumed that each player needs permission from
all its predecessors before it is allowed to cooperate. This implies that a coalition is only
feasible if it is comprehensive from above. Alternatively, according to the disjunctive ap-
7Related is also the model of Faigle and Kern (1992) who consider feasible rankings of the players.
8In this sense these models fall within the theory on restricted cooperation, together with, for example,
the games with limited communication (graph) structure in which the edges of an undirected graph on the
set of players represent binary communication links between the players such that players can cooperate
only if they are connected (see, e.g. Myerson (1977), Kalai et. al. (1978), Owen (1986) and Borm et.
al. (1992)), and the games in a-prioiri coalition structure in which it is assumed that the set of players
is partitioned into disjoint sets which represent social groups such that for a particular player it is more
easy to cooperate with players in its own group than to cooperate with players in other groups (see, e.g.,
Aumann and Dre`ze (1974), Owen (1977), Hart and Kurz (1983) and Winter (1989)).
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proach a player needs permission to cooperate of at least one of its predecessors. Given the
sets of feasible coalitions, a restricted game is deﬁned which assigns to every coalition the
worth of its largest feasible subset. Applying well-known solutions as the Shapley value,
Core or Harsanyi set to such restricted games yields solutions for games with a permission
structure. We want to stress that the two approaches of restricting payoﬀ distributions as
done in the underlying paper, and restricting cooperation possibilities as in games with a
permission structure are essentially diﬀerent. The Restricted Harsanyi set is a subset of
the Harsanyi set of the game (without ordered players) and therefore reﬁnes the concept of
Harsanyi set. In the alternative approach of restricting the cooperation possibilities, not
all coalitions are feasible anymore and therefore the Core of the restricted game is larger
than the Core of the original game. So, when considering, for example, the class of almost
positive games (on which the Harsanyi set and Core are equal), putting restrictions on
the distributions of the dividends always gives a reﬁnement of the set of outcomes, while
restricted cooperation may enlarge the set of outcomes according to these solutions.
In Section 5 we discussed shortly two alternative solutions for games with ordered
players. As another alternative, we can use the concept of top cycle. A set of nodes is a
top cycle, if there is a directed path between any pair of nodes within the set and there is
no directed path from a node outside the set to a node in the set. A node is a top-node if
it is in a top-cycle. Now the inequalities for the Restricted Harsanyi set can be weakened
by requiring that top-nodes within the digraph (respectively inverse digraph) restricted to
T get at least (most) as much of the dividend of coalition T as the players that do not
belong to the top of T . This ‘Top-node’ Restricted Harsanyi set also always contains the
Shapley value and is a subset of the Harsanyi set of the unrestricted game. It equals the
Harsanyi set of the unrestricted game if the digraph is empty or complete. However, it
never consists of a unique element and therefore does not generalize the Shapley value.
So, this top-node approach does not look so attractive as alternative for the Restricted
Harsanyi set. However, for the Restricted Selectope of a game with ordered players it has
nice properties. In Section 5 we saw that this set is empty whenever the underlying digraph
has a (directed) cycle. Weakening our selector requirement by saying that the dividend of
a coalition T should always be assigned to a player in the top of the digraph restricted to
that coalition T , respectively to the top of the inverse digraph in case of negative dividends,
it follows that the Restricted Selectope according to this selection rule is always nonempty
since any digraph has at least one top-node.
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